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Abstract
We consider games in which players search for a hidden prize, and they have asymmet-
ric information about the prize’s location. We study the social payoff in equilibria of
these games. We present sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium that
yields the first-best payoff (i.e., the highest social payoff under any strategy profile),
and we characterize the first-best payoff. The results have interesting implications for
innovation contests and R&D races.
Keywords: search duplication, decentralized research, social welfare, incomplete in-
formation.
JEL Codes: C72, D82, D83.
1 Introduction
Many real-life situations involve decentralized research with the following four key properties:
(1) agents explore different routes to making a discovery (henceforth, finding a prize), (2)
each agent has private information about the plausibility of different routes (henceforth, the
prize’s potential locations), (3) society gains from a successful discovery, and (4) each agent
gains from being the discoverer (though, the private gain might be different from the social
gain), where the gain is reduced if she is not the sole discoverer. For concreteness, consider
the following motivating example.
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Example 1. Society faces a problem of finding a gene that induces a rare genetic disorder.
There are various possible research directions that may lead to finding the culprit gene.
Different research labs (or pharmaceutical R&D divisions) have heterogeneous private infor-
mation about the identity of the culprit gene. Society gains if the gene is found by at least
one lab. A lab that discovers the gene gains from the discovery (credit or award for the
scientists, or future profits for the pharmaceutical firm), and this gain is reduced if multiple
labs jointly make the discovery.
These situations (henceforth, search games) are common in various important areas such
as R&D races in oligopolistic markets (e.g., Loury et al., 1979; Fershtman & Rubinstein,
1997; Chatterjee & Evans, 2004; Konrad, 2014; Akcigit & Liu, 2015; Letina, 2016; Liu &
Wong, 2019), design of innovation contests (e.g., Che & Gale, 2003; Adamczyk et al., 2012,
Erat & Krishnan, 2012; Bryan & Lemus, 2017; Letina & Schmutzler, 2019; Mihm & Schlapp,
2019; Matros et al., 2019), pharmaceutical research (e.g., Matros & Smirnov, 2016; de Roos
et al., 2018), academic research (e.g., Kleinberg & Oren, 2011), and product design within
a firm (e.g., Loch et al., 2001). Most of the existing literature assumes that all agents have
symmetric information regarding the prize’s location.1 The main methodological innovation
of the present model is the introduction of asymmetric information into search games.
The social payoff is clearly constrained by the information structure, as each player
acts solely based on her private information, since we do not allow players to share their
information. The social payoff may also be constrained by the fact that players’ individual
preferences can differ from society’s, and players have strategic considerations as well. Thus,
our main goal is to study the highest social payoff in equilibrium.
Highlights of the Model There are n players who search for a prize hidden in one of a
finite set of locations. Player i is able to search in ci locations (all at once). She receives some
private coarse signal about the actual location of the prize, and chooses which ci locations to
search. It is a one-shot game (i.e., if the prize is not found, they do not get to search again)
with simultaneous actions. We assume that each private signal is a deterministic function of
the prize’s location. We allow the prize’s value to depend on the location. Also, the value
for society and the individual values of players may all be different.
If multiple players find the prize, then each finder’s value is divided by the overall number
of finders (possibly, reflecting a symmetric lottery determining who is recognized as the “true”
1We are aware of one related existing model of a search game with asymmetric information, that of
Chen et al. (2015). The key difference between our model and theirs is that Chen et al. rely on enforceable
mechanisms, which allow the players to safely share their asymmetric information, as all players must follow a
contract once it has been signed. By contrast, we consider a setup in which players cannot rely on enforceable
mechanisms, and, thus, they are limited to playing Nash equilibria.
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finder). Moreover, the value may be further reduced by a fixed multiplicative factor (possibly
reflecting price wars or credit wars between the finders). By contrast, the social value of the
prize is unaffected by the number of finders.
First Main Result As the main question is what society can achieve in equilibrium, our
answer consists of two parts. Our first main result states that under “reasonable” conditions
there exists a (pure) equilibrium that yields the first-best social payoff, i.e., the highest social
payoff that any strategy profile can yield. The conditions are that for any two locations ω
and ω′ that some player considers possible, (1) that player’s preference between the two
locations does not strictly contradict society’s preference, i.e., it cannot be that her private
value in ω is strictly higher than in ω′ while it is the other way round for society, and (2)
the player always prefers searching ω by herself to searching ω′ with other players.
It is relatively easy to see that neither condition can be dropped. As for their sufficiency,
the intuition is that no player has an incentive to “spoil” society’s payoff by moving from a
socially better location to a worse one, nor by moving from a location that she searches alone
to a location that others search. Note, however, that not all equilibria yield the first-best
payoff. We discuss the implications of this result on the design of innovation contests in
Section 3.4.
Second Main Result Our second main result characterizes the first-best social payoff.
The result is actually slightly broader than that: a strategy profile determines an outcome,
namely, a specification of the locations in which the prize will be found (by anyone) if
the prize is indeed there, and the locations in which it will not. Similarly, a probability
distribution over strategy profiles (a.k.a. a correlated strategy) induces a mixed outcome,
namely, a probability of being found for each location. We characterize the set of mixed
outcomes that are induced by some correlated strategy. In particular, the first-best social
payoff equals the maximal social payoff of outcomes within that set.
Our model does not allow players to coordinate partial search efforts within locations so
that they do not overlap (i.e., allow players i and j to each assign an effort of 50% to location
ω, and let the outcome be that ω is always searched by exactly one of them). As it turns
out, this constraint does not affect the first-best payoff. To see this, suppose to the contrary
that we did allow for such coordination within locations. We show that any outcome of such
a setup can already be achieved in our model by some probability distribution over strategy
profiles (hence, in particular, the social payoff of that outcome is at least equaled by one of
those strategy profiles).2
2Notably, this is not the case with a more elaborate information structure; see Section 5.
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This result is actually strongly connected to the characterization of the first-best payoff
discussed above, constituting a key part of its proof. Overall, our proofs rely on representing
a search game as a bipartite graph and adapting and extending various classic results from
graph theory to our setup: Hall’s marriage theorem (Hall, 1935), max-flow min-cut theorem
(Ford & Fulkerson, 1956), and Birkhoff–von Neumann theorem (Birkhoff, 1946; Von Neu-
mann, 1953).3 Finally, we examine the implications of removing some assumptions of our
model, such as simultaneous one-shot actions and deterministic signals.
Structure Section 2 presents our model. We study the conditions for the existence of an
equilibrium with a first-best social payoff in Section 3. Section 4 characterizes the first-best
payoff. In Section 5 we consider more elaborate information structures, where signals are not
deterministic functions of the prize’s location. Appendix A applies our results to a special
class of search games. Appendix B presents the formal proofs.
2 Model
Setup Let N = {1,2, ...,n} be a finite set of players. A typical player is denoted by i.
We use −i to denote the set of all players except player i. The players search for a prize
hidden in one of the locations described below. In addition to the players, we consider an
external entity, society, who is not one of the players and is indifferent to the identity of the
prize finder, as long as the prize is found. In our normative analysis we set the objective
of maximizing society’s payoff. In the motivating example described above, one can think
of society as representing the regulator in the pharmaceutical industry, who cares for the
welfare of future patients who may be affected by the genetic disorder.
We model the incomplete information a` la Aumann (1976). Let Ω be a finite set of all
states of the world. A typical state is denoted by ω. Importantly, each state of the world
in our model corresponds to a different location of the prize (henceforth, we refer to the
elements of Ω both as states and as locations), which formalizes our assumption that the
prize’s location determines the (coarse) signals of all players.4 For each player i, let Πi be a
partition of Ω, namely, a list of disjoint subsets of Ω whose union is the whole Ω. We refer
to the elements of player i’s partition (i.e., the subsets) as player i’s cells. For each state ω,
3Recent economic applications (and extensions) of these graph-theory results have appeared in matching
mechanisms (e.g., Budish et al., 2013; Bronfman et al., 2018), large anonymous games (e.g., Blonski, 2005),
public good games with multiple resources (e.g., Tierney, 2019), and auctions of multiple discrete items (e.g.,
Ben-Zwi, 2017).
4In Section 5 we explain why deterministic signals can be modeled by having each location correspond
to a single state. In addition, we analyze there a more general model in which signals are not determined by
the prize’s location.
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let πi (ω) denote the cell of player i that contains state ω. If the true state of the world is ω,
then player i knows (due to the private signal that she observes) that the state of the world
is one of the states in πi (ω). Therefore, we can, without loss of generality, identify each
signal that a player may observe with the cell that the signal induces. Figure 1 demonstrates
an information structure in a two-player search game.
Figure 1: Illustration of information structure of a two-player search game
To make the model more general, we allow heterogeneity in the prior beliefs of the players
(as well as in the players’ private payoffs, as detailed below). Let µi ∈∆(Ω) (resp., µs ∈∆(Ω))
denote the prior belief of player i (resp., society) about the state, where ∆(Ω) denotes the
set of distributions over Ω. For a subset of elements (event) E ∈ Ω, let µi (E) =
∑
ω∈E µi (ω)
denote the prior probability that player i assigns to the event E. For simplicity, we assume
that each player assigns a positive probability to each of her cells, i.e., µi (πi) > 0 for each
πi ∈Πi and i ∈N . When the true (unknown) state of the world is ω, each player i assigns a
posterior belief of µi (ω
′|πi (ω)) = µi(ω
′)/µi(πi(ω)) to the state being ω′ ∈ πi (ω), and 0 to any
state ω′ /∈ πi (ω). When everyone shares the same prior we refer to it as the common prior
and denote it simply by µ.
We allow heterogeneity in the number of locations that each player can search. Specif-
ically, each player i chooses up to ci ∈ N locations in which she searches, where ci is the
player’s search capacity. A (pure) strategy of player i is a function si that assigns to each
cell πi ∈ Πi a subset of πi with at most ci elements. We interpret si (πi) as the set of up
to ci locations in which player i searches when she observes the signal πi (if no ambiguity
can arise, we may also say that player i searches in the location ω, if ω ∈ si (πi) for some
πi ∈Πi). We focus in the present paper on pure strategies. Let Si ≡ Si (G) denote the set of
all (pure) strategies of player i, and let S ≡ S (G) =
∏
i∈N Si be the set of strategy profiles
in the game G.
Values and Duplication When the prize is found it yields a private value for its finder,
and a social value for society. We allow these values to depend on the state of the world. For
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any state ω, let vi (ω) ∈ R
+ ≡ {x ∈ R|x≥ 0} (resp., vs (ω) ∈ R
+) denote the prize’s private
value for player i (resp., social value for society) when player i is the sole finder of the prize
in state ω. Observe that the social value does not depend on the identity of the prize’s
finder. The players and society are both assumed to be risk neutral with respect to their
payoffs. We say that the game has common values if vi (ω) = vj (ω) = vs (ω) for every two
players i, j ∈N and every state ω ∈ Ω, and in this case we omit the subscript and write the
common value as v (ω). It turns out that our results depend on the prior µi (ω) and on the
value vi (ω) only through their product µi (ω) ·vi (ω). We refer to this product as the expected
private value of player i in state ω (and µs (ω) · vs (ω) is called the expected social value in
state ω).
If multiple players find the prize, we assume that each finder’s private value is divided
by the number of simultaneous finders (possibly reflecting a symmetric lottery determining
which of these finders is recognized as the “true” finder).5 In addition, each finder’s private
value is multiplied by a duplication factor ρ ∈ [0,1] if two or more players find the prize
simultaneously. The case in which ρ = 0 corresponds to setups in which a price (Bertrand)
competition between the pharmaceutical firms or a “credit war” between the research labs
(see Example 1) destroys the finder’s private value in case of a simultaneous discovery (e.g.,
Chatterjee & Evans, 2004; Matros & Smirnov, 2016; de Roos et al., 2018). The opposite
case of ρ= 1 may correspond to a setup in which one of the players who search in the prize’s
location is randomly chosen to be its undisputed owner, and she gains the prize’s full value
(e.g., Fershtman & Rubinstein, 1997; Konrad, 2014; Chen et al., 2015). In the intermediate
case of ρ ∈ (0,1) some of the prize’s private value is lost when there are multiple finders.6
We assume that the social value of the prize is not reduced when there are multiple
finders, which seems plausible in many setups. For example, it seems plausible that price
competition between competing pharmaceutical firms will not harm society (it might even
benefit the consumers), and that the gain from a new discovery is not likely to be reduced
when two scientists fight over the credit.
Summarizing all the above components allows us to define a search game as a tuple
G= (N,Ω,v,µ,Π, c,ρ), with the various components as defined above.
5In order to simplify notation, our model allows each player to search in each location only once, and
when there are multiple finders, each has the same probability to be the recognized “true” finder. All of our
results can be adapted to a setup in which players may search multiple times in the same location, and they
may choose to do so when competing with other players searching in the same location (i.e., in this modified
setup, if Player 1 (resp.,Player 2) searches twice (resp., once) in the location ω, then, conditional on the true
state being ω, Player 1 (resp., Player 2) is recognized as the ”true” finder with probability 2/3 (resp., 1/3)).
6All of our results remain the same if one assumes that the duplication factor is decreasing in the number
of finders; i.e., if the private value of the prize is ρ(m) ·vi, where m is the number of players simultaneously
finding the prize, ρ(m) is weakly decreasing in m, and ρ stands for ρ(2)/ρ(1).
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Private Payoffs and Equilibrium Fix a search game G and a strategy profile s∈ S. Let
ms (ω) denote the number of players who search in ω when the true state of the world is ω,
i.e.,
ms (ω) =
∑
i∈N
1ω∈si(πi(ω)).
As described above, the payoff of player i conditional on the state being ω, denoted by
ui (s|ω), is equal to vi (ω) if player i is the only player to search in ω, and is equal to
ρ·vi(ω)/ms(ω) if player i has searched ω together with other players, and is equal to zero if the
player has not searched ω. The (ex-ante) expected payoff of player i is denoted by ui (s).
Formally, the expressions for ui (s|ω) and for ui (s) are given by
ui (s|ω) =


vi (ω) ω ∈ si (πi (ω)) andms (ω) = 1
ρ · vi(ω)
ms(ω)
ω ∈ si (πi (ω)) andms (ω)> 1
0 ω 6∈ si (πi (ω))
ui (s) =
∑
ω∈Ω
µi (ω) ·ui (s|ω) .
A strategy profile s = (s1, ..., sn) is a Nash equilibrium of search game G if no player
can gain from unilaterally deviating from the equilibrium, i.e., if for every player i and
every strategy s′i the following inequality holds: ui (s)≥ ui (s
′
i, s−i) , where s−i describes the
strategy profile played by all players except player i.
Social Payoff Fix a search game G and a strategy profile s. Let U (s|ω) = vs (ω) ·1ms(ω)≥1
denote the social payoff, conditional on the state being ω. The expected social payoff, given
the social prior µs, is equal to U (s) =
∑
ω∈Ωµs (ω) ·U (s|ω). Let US denote the socially
optimal payoff (or the first-best payoff):
US =max
s∈S
U (s) .
A strategy profile s is socially optimal if it achieves the socially optimal payoff, i.e., if
U (s) = US . A strategy profile is state-maximizing if it maximizes the number of states in
which the prize is found, i.e., if for any strategy profile s′ ∈ S the following inequality holds
∑
ω∈Ω
1{ms(ω)≥1} ≥
∑
ω∈Ω
1{ms′(ω)≥1}.
Note that the set of socially optimal strategy profiles may be different from the set of
state-maximizing strategy profiles. The two notions coincide if society assigns the same
expected value to every location, i.e., if vs (ω) ·µs (ω) = vs (ω
′) ·µs (ω
′) for any two states
ω,ω′ ∈ Ω. A strategy profile is exhaustive if the prize is always found, i.e., if ms (ω)≥ 1 for
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every ω ∈Ω. It is immediate that an exhaustive strategy profile is both socially optimal and
state-maximizing.
3 Socially Optimal Equilibrium
In this section we characterize the existence of socially optimal equilibria; that is, we study
the conditions under which the strategic constraints (namely, that each player maximizes
her private payoff, rather than the social payoff) do not limit the social payoff.
3.1 Search Games are Weakly Acyclic
A sequence of strategy profiles
(
s1, ..., sK
)
is an improvement path (Monderer & Shapley,
1996) if each strategy profile sk+1 differs from its preceding profile sk by the strategy of a
single player, and this player’s payoff is strictly higher in sk+1.
Definition 1. Fix a search game G. A sequence of strategy profiles
(
s1, ..., sK
)
is an im-
provement path if for every k ∈ {1, ...,K−1} there exists a player ik ∈ N such that: (1)
skj = s
k+1
j for every player j 6= i, and (2) ui
(
sk+1
)
> ui
(
sk
)
.
We begin by presenting an auxiliary result, which states that any search game is weakly
acyclic: starting from any strategy profile, there exists an improvement path that ends in a
Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2 (Milchtaich, 1996). A game is weakly acyclic if for any strategy profile s1 ∈ S,
there exists an improvement path
(
s1, ..., sK
)
, such that sK is a (pure) Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Any search game is weakly acyclic.
Sketch of proof; formal proof is in Appendix B.1. Player i has ci units of capacity, which we
index by numbers between 1 and ci. A cell-unit of player i is a pair (π,j), where π ∈ Πi is
a cell, and j a unit index. We can think of a player’s strategy as being composed of many
“smaller” choices, one choice of location for each of the player’s cell-units.7 Given a strategy
profile, the (ex-ante) expected payoff of a player is the sum of her cell-unit payoffs (i.e., the
(ex-ante) expected payoff from the location of each cell-unit). When a cell-unit of player i
improves its own payoff then it also improves the payoff of player i, and, conversely, when
player i can improve her payoff there must exist a cell-unit of hers that can improve its own
payoff by changing its choice.
7The game played by cell-units is in the spirit of Selten’s (1975) agent-normal form representation.
8
The key part is Lemma 1 in Appendix B.1 that says that if the members of a set B of
cell-units (of various players) are best-responding, and α /∈B is another cell-unit, then there
is a sequence of improvements that ends with all the members of B∪{α} best-responding.
To prove this, first let α move from its current location ω0 to its best-response location ω1.
Now add a dummy player at ω0. Now begins Phase I of the improvements, which ends when
nobody has an incentive to move or when somebody has just moved into ω0.
Note that at this point: (a) there is one location (“the plus location”; currently it is ω1)
that is chosen by one more cell-unit compared to when we started, while the number is the
same for all other locations; and (b) only cell-units located at the plus location may have
an incentive to move. At every stage of Phase I, a cell-unit moves from the plus location
to its best-response location, making the best-response location the new plus location. By
induction from one stage to the next we see that properties (a) and (b) continue to hold at
every stage of the phase.
Consider a cell-unit that moves (making its new location the plus location). Afterwards,
its payoff cannot drop below its current level; it may only be higher (if the plus location is
somewhere else). In particular, its payoff will never drop back to the level it was at before
it moved. This implies that the sequence cannot enter a cycle; therefore, the sequence must
end.
When Phase I ends we remove the dummy from ω0. If Phase I ends because someone has
just moved into ω0, then there is no longer a plus location (since the dummy is removed),
and property (b) implies that everyone is now best-responding, and we are done. Otherwise,
Phase I ends because everyone was best-responding when the dummy was in ω0. Let s
∗
denote the strategy profile we have reached. Note that: (a’) there is one location (“the minus
location”; currently it is ω0) chosen by one less player compared to s
∗ with the dummy, while
the number is the same for all other locations; and (b’) cell-units may have an incentive to
move only to the minus location.
While Phase I can be described as restabilizing after one cell-unit is added, the analogous
Phase II that now follows restabilizes after one cell-unit is removed. At every stage of Phase
II, a cell-unit strictly improves its payoff by moving into the minus location (if there is more
than one candidate we take one whose current payoff is minimal). By induction we see that
properties (a’) and (b’) still hold during the whole phase. The sequence cannot enter a cycle
by the same argument of Phase I, and hence Phase II eventually ends. Then everyone is
best-responding, and the lemma is proven.
To prove weak acyclicity, start from any profile s1. Using the lemma inductively we add
one cell-unit at a time, until eventually everyone is best-responding.
An immediate corollary of Prop. 1 is that any search game admits a pure equilibrium.
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Corollary 1. Any search game admits a pure Nash equilibrium.
3.2 Existence of a Socially Optimal Equilibrium
We begin by defining two properties that are required for our first main result (Theorem 1).
Consistency Our first property requires consistency between the private payoff and the
social payoff in different locations. We say that a search game has consistent payoffs if for
any two states ω and ω′ in the same cell of player i, if the expected private value for player
i is strictly lower in ω than in ω′, then the expected social value is weakly lower in ω.
Definition 3. Search game G= (N,Ω,v,µ,Π, c,ρ) has consistent payoffs if for any player i,
any cell πi ∈ Πi, and any two states ω,ω
′ ∈ πi, the following implication holds:
µi (ω) ·vi (ω)< µi
(
ω′
)
·vi
(
ω′
)
⇒ µs (ω) ·vs (ω)≤ µs
(
ω′
)
·vs
(
ω′
)
.
Observe that if everyone shares a common prior and a common value, then the search game
has consistent payoffs. Further observe that if society has uniform expected values (i.e.,
if µs (ω) · vs (ω) = µs (ω
′) · vs (ω
′) for any two states ω,ω′ ∈ Ω), then the search game has
consistent payoffs regardless of what players’ private payoffs are.
Balancedness Our second property requires that the expected private value does not vary
too much within a player’s cell. We say that a search game is r-balanced if the expected
value of any player in any two states in the same cell differs by a factor of at most r.
Definition 4. Let r ≥ 1. Search game G = (N,Ω,v,µ,Π, c,ρ) has r-balanced payoffs if for
any player i, any cell πi ∈ Πi, and any pair ω,ω
′ ∈ πi, the following inequality holds:
vi (ω) ·µi (ω)≤ r ·vi
(
ω′
)
·µi
(
ω′
)
.
We say that a game has balanced payoffs if it has 2/ρ-balanced payoffs (or if ρ= 0).
Our first main result states that any search game with consistent and balanced payoffs
admits a socially optimal pure Nash equilibrium. Formally:
Theorem 1. Let G be a search game with consistent and balanced payoffs. Then there exists
a socially optimal (pure) equilibrium.
Proof. Consider a pure strategy profile that maximizes the social payoff. Proposition 1
implies that there is a finite sequence of unilateral improvements that ends in a Nash equi-
librium. In what follows we show that the properties of consistency and balancedness jointly
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imply that the social payoff cannot decrease along that sequence of unilateral improve-
ments. Without loss of generality we can assume that each unilateral improvement consists
of changing merely a single location within a single cell, since this is in fact what the proof
of Proposition 1 shows. In each improvement, if the improving player leaves a location in
which there were multiple searchers, then the social payoff cannot decrease. Balancedness
implies that an improving player never moves from a location ω in which she was the sole
searcher to an occupied location ω′, due to the following inequality:
vi (ω) ·µi (ω)≥ ρ/2 ·vi
(
ω′
)
·µi
(
ω′
)
≥ ρ/ms(ω′) ·vi
(
ω′
)
·µi
(
ω′
)
.
Finally, consistency implies that if an improving player moves from being the sole searcher
in location ω to being the sole searcher in location ω′ (and this move strictly increases her
payoff), then the social payoff must weakly increase.
In Section 3.4 we discuss implications of Theorem 1 on the design of innovation contests.
Our next result states that even without the consistency assumption, some efficiency is still
guaranteed, in the sense that there exists an equilibrium that maximizes the number of states
in which the players search. Formally:
Corollary 2. Every search game G with balanced payoffs admits a state-maximizing equi-
librium.
Proof. Let Gˆ= (N,Ω, vˆ,µ,Π, c,ρ) be a search game similar to G= (N,Ω,v,µ,Π, c,ρ), except
that society has uniform expected payoffs, i.e., µs (ω) · vˆs (ω) = µs (ω
′) · vˆs (ω
′) for any two
states ω,ω′ ∈Ω. Observe that Gˆ is a search game with consistent and balanced payoffs. This
implies that the game Gˆ admits a socially optimal equilibrium sˆ. Observe that the definition
of vˆs implies that sˆ is a state-maximizing strategy profile. Further observe that sˆ is also an
equilibrium of G (as G and Gˆ differ only in the social payoff).
In particular, when ρ= 0 (i.e., duplication destroys the prize’s private values), balanced-
ness is trivially satisfied; therefore, every search game with ρ= 0 admits a state-maximizing
equilibrium.
Price of Anarchy Theorem 1 shows that there is an equilibrium that maximizes the social
payoff (i.e., that the price of stability is 1) in any search game with consistent and balanced
payoffs. By contrast, Figure 2 demonstrates that the social payoff might be substantially
lower in other Nash equilibria (i.e., that the price of anarchy can be more than 1). We note,
on the other hand, that in any search game with common values and a common prior, a
simple argument shows that the price of anarchy cannot exceed n (the number of players).
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Figure 2: Example for the price of anarchy. The figure presents two equilibria in a two-
player search game with 1-balanced consistent payoffs (the ellipses represent the partition
elements) with a uniform common prior and a common value of v ≡ 1. The first (resp.,
second) equilibrium is (resp., is not) socially optimal with a social payoff of 1 (resp., 0.75).
3.3 Necessity of All Assumptions in Theorem 1
The following three examples demonstrate that all the assumptions of Theorem 1 are neces-
sary to guarantee the existence of a socially optimal equilibrium. We postpone the discussion
of the necessity of deterministic signals to Section 5.
Necessity of Balancedness Example 2 demonstrates that the balancedness condition is
necessary for Theorem 1, in the sense that for any r > 2/ρ there exists a search game with
r-balanced consistent payoffs that does not admit a socially optimal equilibrium.
Example 2. Let ρ ∈ (0,1] and let r > 2/ρ. Let
G=
(
N = {1,2} ,Ω =
{
ω,ω′
}
,v ≡ 1,µ,Π≡ Ω, c≡ 1,ρ
)
be a search game with trivial information partitions (Π≡Ω,), common uniform values v≡ 1,
and a common prior µ = µ1 = µ2 = µs defined as follows: µ(ω) =
r
1+r and µ(ω
′) = 11+r .
Observe that G has consistent and r-balanced payoffs. In what follows we show that the
unique best-reply against an opponent who searches in location ω is to search in ω as well
(which implies that searching in ω is a dominant strategy). This is so because searching in
location ω yields a payoff of
ρ ·
µ(ω)
2
= ρ ·
r
2 · (1+ r)
= ρ ·
r
2
·µ
(
ω′
)
> µ
(
ω′
)
,
while searching in location ω′ yields a strictly smaller payoff of µ(ω′). This, in turn, implies
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that the unique equilibrium is both players searching in ω, which is suboptimal (its payoff
is r1+r < 1, while searching in different locations yields a social payoff of 1).
Necessity of Consistency Example 3 demonstrates that the consistency requirement is
necessary to guarantee the existence of a socially optimal equilibrium. Specifically, it shows
that even for one-player search games, and even when society and the player have the same
ordinal ranking over the values of the prize in each location, the unique Nash equilibrium is
not necessarily socially optimal if the consistency requirement is not satisfied.
Example 3. Let G= (N = {1} ,Ω = {ω,ω′} ,v,µ,Π≡ Ω, c≡ 1,ρ= 0) be a search game with
a common prior (i.e., µ
1
= µs = µ) µ(ω) = 1/4, µ(ω
′) = 3/4, and with values of vs (ω) = 2,
vs (ω
′) = 1, v
1
(ω) = 4, and v
1
(ω′) = 1. Observe that the game’s payoffs are trivially balanced
due to ρ being zero. It is simple to see that the player searches in location ω in the unique
equilibrium, although this yields a lower social payoff than searching in ω′.
Necessity of Simultaneous Searches An (implicit) key assumption in our model is that
all searches are done simultaneously. In what follows we demonstrate that if searches are
done sequentially, then Theorem 1 is no longer true. We present two examples, one of a
setup in which a player can observe the locations in which her opponents searched in the
past, and the other of a setup without observability. Both examples share the following
properties: (1) the prior is uniform, (2) the private and social values of the prize are equal to
δm in all states, where m is the round in which the prize is found, for some common discount
factor δ ∈ (0,1), and (3) there are two players who play sequentially: player 1 searches in
odd rounds and player 2 searches in even rounds.
Consider first an example with observability of the opponent’s past searches. Assume
that the prize is hidden within a matrix of states where player 1 knows the row and player 2
knows the column. Observe that the unique socially optimal strategy profile finds the prize
in at most two rounds: player 1 searches in the correct row in round 1, and player 2 searches
in the prize’s true location in the second round. Observe that this socially optimal strategy
profile is not a Nash equilibrium, as player 1 would gain by deviating to searching in a wrong
row in round 1 (in order to deceive the opponent about the prize’s row) and searching in the
prize’s location in round 3 (after observing the column in which player 2 searches in round
2).
Next consider an example without observability of past searches. Assume that there are
two locations ω,ω′, and partitions are trivial. In any socially optimal strategy profile, player
1 searches deterministically in round 1 (say, in location ω), and player 2 searches in the
remaining location (ω′) in round 2, which guarantees that the prize is found within at most
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2 rounds. Assume to the contrary that player 1 plays deterministically in round 1 in a Nash
equilibrium (say, she searches in ω). This implies that player 2 searches in the remaining
state ω′ in round 2. This, in turn, implies that player 1 would gain by deviating to searching
in ω′ in round 1 (and searching in ω in round 3), as this guarantees that player 1 always
finds the prize.
3.4 Insights for Innovation Contests
In what follows we discuss the implications of Theorem 1 in the setup of an innovation
contest (e.g., Che & Gale, 2003; Adamczyk et al., 2012; Erat & Krishnan, 2012; Bryan &
Lemus, 2017; Letina & Schmutzler, 2019; Mihm & Schlapp, 2019; Matros et al., 2019), in
which a contest designer, who wishes to maximize the social payoff, might influence the
private payoffs of players by offering a monetary reward to the prize’s finder, which is added
to the finder’s private value.
Observe first that if the private payoffs satisfy consistency and balancedness, then Theo-
rem 1 implies that the designer can maximize the social payoff without offering any reward:
the designer is only required to be able to give nonenforced recommendations to the play-
ers (which allows him to induce the play of the socially optimal Nash equilibrium, rather
than other equilibria). In what follows we consider the case in which either balancedness or
consistency is violated in the search game (without additional monetary rewards).
Consider first a setup in which the contest designer can only offer a constant reward,
which is independent of the prize’s location. A constant reward can help to increase the
relative expected private value of locations with a high prior probability. As a result, it can
help obtain the optimal social payoff, when the reason for not having the required properties
without the designer’s intervention is a low-prior location having a too-high private value.
For example, consider a search game with no depreciation in the case of duplication (i.e.,
ρ = 1), where there are two states ω,ω′ in the same cell of player i with priors µi (ω) = 0.1
and µi (ω
′) = 0.2 and with private values of vi (ω) = 5 and vi (ω
′) = 1. The too-high private
value of state ω violates balancedness (= 2-balancedness) because the expected private value
in ω (0.5 = 0.1 · 5) is more than twice the expected private value in ω′ (0.2 · 1). A constant
reward of 1 would restore balancedness (making the expected private value of ω and ω′ to
be equal to 0.6 = 0.1 · (5+1) and 0.4 = 0.2 · (1+1), respectively).
When the designer can offer a location-dependent and player-dependent reward, it allows
him to obtain balancedness and consistency when faced with any profile of private payoffs
and private priors. An interesting open question is how the designer can maximize the social
payoff, while minimizing the expected reward. For example, assume that the payoffs of the
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search game are consistent, but they are not balanced. Theorem 1 suggests that the designer
should reward locations that have lower expected private values (which violate balancedness).
Note that these locations might not coincide with the locations that are not searched by any
player in the inefficient equilibrium. This is demonstrated in Example 4.
Example 4. Consider the following search game with a common prior and common values
(as illustrated in Figure 3): (N = {1,2} ,Ω = {ω1,ω2,ω3,ω4} ,v ≡ 1,µ,Π, c≡ 1,ρ= 1), where
Figure 3: Illustration of Example 4: Impact of Rewards on the Social Payoff
the common prior is µ(ω1) = 44%, µ(ω2) = 21%, µ(ω3) = 20% and µ(ω4) = 15%, player 1
observes whether the state is 1 or not, i.e., Π1 = {{ω1} ,{ω2,ω3,ω4}}, and player 2 observes
whether the state is at most 2 or not, i.e., Π2 = {{ω1,ω2} ,{ω3,ω4}}. The game admits a
unique equilibrium, in which player 1 searches in locations ω1 and ω2, while player 2 searches
in locations ω1 and ω3. This equilibrium yields an expected social payoff of 0.85 because no
player searches in ω4. Note that the cause of unbalancedness is the low expected payoff in
state ω2 (rather than a low expected payoff in ω4).
If the social planner can offer a reward of 0.05 that increases the total private payoff in
location ω2 by 5% to 1.05 (which requires a modest expected reward of 21% · 0.05 ≈ 0.01),
then the modified private payoffs satisfy balancedness, and, as a result, the game admits a
socially optimal equilibrium with a social payoff of 1 (in which player 1 searches in locations
ω1 and ω4, while player 2 searches in locations ω2 and ω3).
4 Feasible Outcomes and the Socially Optimal Payoff
In this section we characterize the socially optimal payoff in search games.
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4.1 Feasible Outcomes
Pure outcomes A pure outcome is a function f : Ω→ {0,1} that specifies, for every
location, whether that location is being searched (by anyone) or not. A pure outcome f is
feasible if there exists a strategy profile s ∈ S that induces f , i.e., if f (ω) = 1{ms(ω)>0}. Let
fs denote the outcome induced by strategy profile s ∈ S. We may think of an outcome as a
possible goal set by society. In a more abstract model than ours, in which society does not
maintain exact priors and values but still has (perhaps incomplete) preferences over various
outcomes, a social planner would like to know which outcomes are feasible.
We say that a pure outcome is compatible with the information structure if the number
of locations being searched within any subset of locations does not exceed the sum of players’
capacities over all cells that intersect that subset. Formally:
Definition 5. Fix a search game G. A pure outcome f is compatible with the information
structure (abbr., compatible) if for each subset W ⊆ Ω, the following inequality holds:
∑
ω∈W
f (ω)≤
∑
i∈N
ci ·
∑
πi∈Πi
1πi∩W 6=∅ . (1)
Compatibility is clearly necessary for an outcome to be feasible in a setup in which players
cannot share their information, and each player decides where to search as a function of her
own signal. In such a setup, each player i has
∑
πi∈Πi ci · 1πi∩W 6=∅ cells that intersect the
set W , and thus she cannot search in more than ci ·
∑
πi∈Πi 1πi∩W 6=∅ locations within W .
This implies that all players combined cannot search in more than
∑
i∈N ci ·
∑
πi∈Πi 1πi∩W 6=∅
locations within W . By representing the setup as a bipartite graph and applying Hall’s
marriage theorem (Hall, 1935), it can be shown that compatibility is also a sufficient condition
for feasibility.
Proposition 2. A pure outcome f in a search game is feasible iff it is compatible.
Sketch of proof; formal proof is omitted because it is implied by Theorem 2. For simplicity, as-
sume that each player has a capacity of one. Consider a bipartite undirected graph in which
the left side of the graph includes the players’ cells in the search game, and the right side
includes the states for which f is equal to one (as illustrated in Figure 4). The graph’s
edges connect each cell to the states that are contained in that cell. A matching of all states
in this graph, i.e., a set of disjoint edges (namely, no node appears twice) such that every
state belongs to some edge, corresponds to a strategy profile that induces f . Hall’s theorem
states that such a matching exists iff for any subset of states W , the number of its neighbors
|N (W )| is at least |W |. The neighbors of W in this graph are the cells that intersect W ;
therefore, this condition is equivalent to f being compatible.
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Figure 4: Illustration of Proposition 2. The LHS of the figure demonstrates the informa-
tion partitions in a two-player search game (with capacities equal to 1). The RHS translates
this into a bipartite graph, where its left part (“men”) includes the cells of all players, and
its right part (“women”) includes all states ω satisfying f (ω) = 1. The figure further shows
an example of a subset of states W and the corresponding set of its neighbors - N (W ) .
The following example and corollary apply Proposition 2 to obtain a simple sufficient
condition for the existence of exhaustive strategy profiles, in terms of the size of the largest
cell of each player.
Example 5. Suppose that there are three players, each has capacity ci = 1, and every cell
of every player contains exactly three states. Consider the pure outcome f (ω) = 1 for every
ω. To see that f is compatible, let W ⊂ Ω be a subset of states. The number of cells πi of
player i that intersect W is at least |W |3 , because the size of every cell is 3. Therefore,
∑
i∈N
∑
πi∈Πi
1πi∩W 6=∅ ≥ 3 ·
|W |
3
= |W |=
∑
ω∈W
f (ω) ,
i.e., f is compatible. By Proposition 2, f is feasible, i.e., this game admits an exhaustive
strategy profile, and the socially optimal payoff equals
∑
ω∈Ωµs (ω) ·vs (ω).
More generally, the argument employed in Example 5 proves the following corollary of
Proposition 2.
Corollary 3. Let G be a search game, and let Mi =max(|πi| : πi ∈ Πi) be the size the largest
cell of player i. If
∑
i∈N ci/Mi ≥ 1 then G admits an exhaustive strategy profile.
Note that if a game admits an exhaustive profile and has balanced payoffs, then it admits
an exhaustive equilibrium, by Corollary 2.
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Mixed outcomes A mixed outcome is a function f : Ω→ [0,1] that assigns a probability
to each state. We interpret f (ω) as the probability that the prize is found, conditional on
the state of the world being ω. A mixed outcome may be a goal set by society, perhaps
involving such considerations as fairness, equal opportunity, etc.
A correlated strategy profile σ ∈∆(S) is a lottery over the set of pure strategy profiles.
A mixed outcome is feasible if it can be induced by a correlated strategy profile. That is,
f : Ω→ [0,1] is feasible if there exists a correlated strategy profile σ ∈∆(S) such that
f (ω) =
∑
s∈S
σ (s) ·fs (ω)≡
∑
s∈S
σ (s) ·1{ms(ω)>0}.
Let fσ denote the mixed outcome induced by correlated strategy profile σ ∈∆(S).
A mixed outcome is compatible with the information structure if the sum of the probabil-
ities of finding the prize (henceforth, finding probabilities) of any subset of states is bounded
by the sum of all relevant capacities, i.e., the players’ capacities over all cells that intersect
that subset. Formally:
Definition 6. Fix a search game G. A mixed outcome f is compatible with the information
structure (abbr., compatible) if for each subset of states W ⊆ Ω, the following inequality
holds: ∑
ω∈W
f (ω)≤
∑
i∈N
∑
πi∈Πi
ci ·1πi∩W 6=∅ . (2)
Let FC be the set of compatible mixed outcomes. Clearly, compatibility is necessary for a
mixed outcome to be feasible, because any feasible mixed outcome lies in the convex hull of
feasible pure outcomes, all of which satisfy compatibility. In what follows we show that the
converse is also true, i.e., that compatibility is sufficient for a mixed outcome to be feasible.
Theorem 2. A mixed outcome f in a search game is feasible iff it is compatible.
Note that we cannot directly use Hall’s theorem for this result, due to the outcome being
mixed, rather than pure (as Hall’s theorem applies only to “binary” matching of zeros and
ones). Instead, the proof (presented in Section 4.2) includes two parts: (1) we introduce
the notion of coordinated-search profiles, and apply (Proposition 3) the max-flow min-cut
theorem to show that any compatible mixed outcome can be induced by a coordinated-search
profile, and (2) we apply (Proposition 4) the Birkhoff–von Neumann theorem to show that
coordinated-search profiles induce feasible mixed outcomes.
Before presenting the next example, we define a strategy profile s as redundancy-free
if (1) every player always uses her entire capacity (i.e., |si (πi)∩πi| = ci for every cell πi of
every player i), and (2) there is no search duplication (i.e., ms (ω)≤ 1 for every ω ∈Ω). Since
18
a player can search in no more than ci |Πi| states, a strategy profile is redundancy-free iff
the number of states being searched equals
∑
i∈N ci |Πi|. If a game admits redundancy-free
strategy profiles, then they are exactly the state-maximizing profiles.
The following example and corollary apply Theorem 2 to obtain a simple sufficient condi-
tion for the existence of redundancy-free strategy profiles, in terms of the size of the smallest
cell of each player.
Example 6. Suppose that there are three players, each has capacity ci = 1, and every cell of
every player contains exactly five states. Consider the mixed outcome f (ω) = 0.6 for every
ω, and let W ⊂ Ω be a subset of states. The number of cells πi of player i that intersect W
is at least |W |5 ; therefore,
∑
i∈N
∑
πi∈Πi
1πi∩W 6=∅ ≥ 3 ·
|W |
5
= 0.6 · |W |=
∑
ω∈W
f (ω) ,
i.e., f is compatible. By Theorem 2, f can be induced by a correlated strategy profile. Since
∑
ω∈Ω f (ω) = 0.6 · |Ω| =
∑
i∈N ci |Πi|, this implies that the game admits a redundancy-free
strategy profile (and if the game is balanced then it admits a redundancy-free equilibrium).
More generally, the argument employed in Example 6 proves the following corollary.
Corollary 4. Let G be a search game, and let mi=min(|πi| : πi ∈ Πi) be the size the smallest
cell of player i. If
∑
i∈N ci/mi ≤ 1 then G admits a redundancy-free strategy profile.
Theorem 2 implies a characterization of the socially optimal payoff of search games (which
is an equilibrium payoff if the game has consistent and balanced payoffs): The socially
optimal payoff is the highest payoff induced by a compatible mixed outcome. Formally
(where the “moreover” part is implied by Theorem 1):
Corollary 5. Let G be a search game. Then
US = max
f∈FC
∑
ω∈Ω
f (ω)µs (ω)vs (ω) .
Moreover, if G has consistent and balanced payoffs, then US is an equilibrium payoff.
4.2 Coordinated Search
Alternative setup with coordinated search Consider an alternative setup that allows
players to coordinate partial search efforts within a state. Specifically, we now allow each
player to divide fractions of her search capacity among the different states. This is formalized
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as follows. Fix a search game G. For any k ∈ N and any cell π, let D (π,k) denote the set
of all functions η : π→ [0,1] that satisfy
∑
ω∈π η (ω)≤ k. That is, an element of D (π,k) is a
function that assigns a search effort to each state in π such that the total effort is at most k.
A coordinated-search profile is a tuple τ = (τ1, ..., τn), where each function τi assigns to each
cell πi ∈ Πi an element of D (πi, ci). We interpret τi (πi,ω) ≡ τi (πi)(ω) as the (fractional)
search effort player i exerts in state ω ∈ πi (when the player observes the signal πi). Let T
be the set of all coordinated-search profiles. Observe that any (pure) strategy profile in G
is a coordinated-search profile (i.e., S ⊆ T , where an element of D (π,k) that assigns only
search efforts of zeros and ones is identified with the corresponding element of P (π,k)).
Importantly, we assume that fractional search efforts of different players are summed
optimally from society’s point of view. For example, if player i assigns 50% search capacity
to location ω in cell πi (ω) and player j assigns 40% search capacity to location ω in cell
πj (ω), then the prize is found with a total probability of 90%, conditional on the state being
8
ω. Specifically, the social payoff U c (τ) induced by a coordinated-search profile τ is
U c (τ) =
∑
ω∈Ω

min

∑
i∈N
τi (πi (ω) ,ω) ,1



 ·µs (ω) ·vs (ω) .
Observe that any coordinated-search profile induces a mixed outcome, where the finding
probability assigned to each state ω is the sum of the fractional search efforts exerted by
each player i in state ω in cell πi (ω) (bounded by the maximal finding probability of one).
Formally, the mixed outcome fτ induced by the coordinated-search profile τ is defined by
fτ (ω) = min(
∑
i∈N τi (πi (ω) ,ω) ,1) .
Observe that any coordinated-search profile induces a compatible mixed outcome.
Claim 1. Fix G= (N,Ω,v,µ,Π, c,ρ) and τ ∈ T . Then fτ is a compatible mixed outcome.
Proof. Fix a subset of states W ⊆ Ω. Then the following inequality holds (where the last
inequality is implied by
∑
ω∈πi τi (πi,ω)≤ ci):
∑
ω∈W
fτ (ω) =
∑
ω∈W
min

∑
i∈N
τi (πi (ω) ,ω) ,1

≤
∑
i∈N
∑
ω∈W
τi (πi (ω) ,ω)≤
∑
i∈N
ci
∑
πi∈Πi
1πi∩W 6=∅ .
Our next result employs the max-flow min-cut theorem to show that the converse claim is
true as well: any compatible mixed outcome can be induced by a coordinated-search profile.
8This probability is strictly higher than if it were a mixed strategy profile, where with positive proba-
bility (20% = 40% ·50%) there would be search duplication (where both players search in ω), and the total
probability of finding the prize, conditional on the state being ω, would be strictly less than 90%.
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Proposition 3. Fix a search game G and a compatible mixed outcome f . Then there exists
a coordinated-search profile τ that induces f (i.e., f = fτ ).
Sketch of proof; formal proof in Appendix B.2. We construct a flow network: a directed graph
whose edges have flow capacities. The graph connects every cell to the states contained in it,
with infinite flow capacity (as illustrated in Figure 5). We add a source vertex that connects
to every cell, with flow capacity ci, and a sink vertex to which every state ω is connected,
with flow capacity f(ω). A cut is a subset of edges without which there exists no path from
the source to the sink. The compatibility of f implies that the minimal cut has a total ca-
pacity of
∑
ω∈Ω f (ω) . Therefore, by the max-flow min-cut theorem (Ford & Fulkerson, 1956;
see a textbook presentation in Cormen et al., 2009, p. 723, Thm. 26.6), the network admits
a flow of
∑
ω∈Ω f (ω) . We define τ by letting τi (πi,ω) equal the flow from πi to ω.
Figure 5: Illustration of Proposition 3. The left side of the figure demonstrates partitions
in a two-player search game. The right side demonstrates the constructed directed graph in
which (1) a source node is linked to every player’s cells by an edge with the player’s capacity,
and (2) each cell is linked by unlimited edges to all the states within that cell, and (3) each
state ω is linked to a sink node by an edge with capacity f (ω). The gray X-s demonstrate
an example of a cut, i.e., a subset of edges whose removal from the graph disconnects the
source from the sink.
Coordination does not add new outcomes The social payoff is constrained by the fact
that the players are not allowed to share their private signals. This constraint is captured
by the compatibility condition presented above. Another potential constraint on the social
payoff in our main model is that players are not allowed to efficiently coordinate fractional
search efforts within a location as in a coordinated-search profile. In what follows we show
that this constraint does not limit the social payoff. Specifically, we apply the Birkhoff–von
Neumann theorem (Birkhoff, 1946; Von Neumann, 1953; see Berman & Plemmons, 1994, p.
50, for a textbook presentation) to show that any mixed outcome that can be induced by a
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coordinated-search profile is feasible (i.e., it can be induced by a correlated strategy profile
with no coordination of fractional efforts).
Proposition 4. Fix search game G and a coordinated-search profile τ ∈ T . Then there exists
a correlated strategy profile σ ∈∆(S) such that fτ = fσ.
Sketch of proof (see Appendix B.3 for the formal proof). To simplify the sketch of the proof
assume that all capacities are equal to one. Let τ be a coordinated-search profile. We can
represent the profile τ as a matrix (Aτπω)ω∈Ω,π is a cell , where
Aτπω =


τi (π,ω) ω ∈ π, π ∈ Πi
0 elsewhere.
Observe that Aτπω is a nonnegative matrix, and that the sum of each row π is at most one.
Let Bτπω be a matrix derived from A
τ
πω by decreasing elements of the matrix such that the
sum of each column ω that exceeded one in Aτπω is equal to one in B
τ
πω. Observe that B
τ
πω
is a doubly substochastic matrix; i.e., it is a nonnegative matrix for which the sum of each
column and each row is at most one. A simple adaptation of the Birkhoff–von Neumann
theorem shows that Bτπω can be represented as a convex combination of matrices C
1
πω, ...,C
K
πω
(i.e., Bτπω =
∑
wk ·C
k
πω where
∑
wk = 1 and wk ≥ 0), where each matrix C
k
πω: (1) contains
only zeros and ones, and (2) contains in each row and in each column at most a single value
of one. Observe that each such matrix Ckπω corresponds to a pure strategy profile s
k in the
search game, and that the outcome fτ is a weighted sum of the outcomes induced by the
profiles sk. This implies that fτ is feasible because it is induced by the correlated strategy
profile σ =
∑
wk · s
k.
In the following example, Proposition 4 is used to prove that the game admits an ex-
haustive strategy profile.
Example 7. Let the set of states Ω=A ·∪B1 ·∪B2 ·∪B3 be a union of four disjoint sets of equal
size. There are three players, each with capacity ci = 1. The partition Πi of player i consists
of cells of size two {a,b}, where a∈A and b∈Bi, and of cells of size six, whose members come
from Bj∪Bk (j,k 6= i). The partitions are illustrated in Figure 6. Define a coordinated-search
profile τ as follows. For πi = {a,b}, τi(πi,a) = 1/3 and τi(πi, b) = 2/3, and for πi of size six, τi
assigns 1/6 to every state in πi. Thus, for any a∈A,
∑
i∈N τi (πi (a) ,a) = 1/3+1/3+1/3=1, and
for any b1 ∈B1,
∑
i∈N τi (πi (b1) , b1)= 2/3+1/6+1/6=1, and similarly for B2 and B3; therefore,
fτ (ω) = 1 for every ω ∈Ω. Proposition 4 implies that the game admits an exhaustive strategy
profile (and if the game is balanced, it also admits an exhaustive equilibrium).
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Figure 6: Illustration of Example 7 with |Ω| = 12 states. The figure shows the players’
partitions (where the cell containing the remaining six states of each player is not drawn to
make the figure less crowded).
Note that |Πi| = |Ω|/3, implying that |Ω| =
∑
i∈N ci |Πi|; therefore, a strategy profile in
this game is exhaustive iff it is redundancy-free. Redundancy-freeness can, alternatively, be
deduced from the fact that under τ players always use their entire capacity and the sum of
fractional search efforts
∑
i∈N τi (πi (ω) ,ω) does not exceed one in any state ω.
Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 jointly imply Theorem 2. Moreover, Proposition 4
implies that if some level of social payoff is yielded by a coordinated-search profile, then the
same or higher social payoff can be yielded by a pure strategy profile. That is, the ability to
coordinate search efforts does not improve the social payoff. Formally:
Corollary 6. Fix G= (N,Ω,v,µ,Π, c,ρ) and a coordinated-search profile τ ∈ T . Then, there
exists a pure strategy profile s ∈ S such that U (s)≥ U c (τ).
Proof. Proposition 4 implies that fτ =
∑
wk · fsk , where
∑
wk = 1, wk ≥ 0, and sk ∈ S for
each k. This implies that U c (τ) =
∑
wk ·U (sk), which, in turn, implies that U
c (τ)≤ U (sk)
for some k.
In Appendix A we apply our results to search games in which the intersection of every
profile of cells includes at least k states, and derive tight conditions for the existence of
equilibria with appealing properties.
5 Extension with Stochastic Signals
In this section we present a general model of signals, dropping the assumption that every
location corresponds to a single state. We also discuss a weaker assumption, under which all
our results still hold.
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5.1 Adaptations to the Model
To extend our model to the general case, we let the set of locations and the set of states
be different objects. Let Ω denote the set of states. A state of the world determines the
location of the prize, and we let ℓ(ω) denote the prize’s location when the state of the world
is ω. Thus, the different locations induce a partition of Ω, and without loss of generality we
let L, the set of locations, be that partition. That is, a location ℓ ∈ L is an element of the
partition, namely, a subset of states such that ℓ(ω) is the same for every ω in the subset.
With a slight abuse of notation, we denote by ω a location that includes only the state ω.
For a cell πi ∈ Πi, let ℓ(πi) be the set of locations that are consistent with the state being
in πi, i.e., ℓ(πi) = {ℓ(ω) |ω ∈ πi}.
A generalized search game is a tuple G˜ = (N,Ω,v,µ,Π,L,c,ρ), where L is the partition
of locations, and all other components are as defined in the baseline model. To prevent
confusion we use the term simple search game to refer to the search games of the baseline
model (in which each location corresponds to a single state).
A strategy of player i is a function si that assigns to each cell πi a subset of locations with
at most ci elements that satisfies si (πi) ⊆ ℓ(πi). We interpret si (πi) as the set of up to ci
locations in which the player searches when she observes the signal πi. When the state of the
world is ω, player i finds the prize if she searches in the location ℓ(ω), i.e., if ℓ(ω)∈ si (πi (ω)).
We redefine the number of players who search in the prize’s location when the state is ω as
follows: ms (ω) =
∑
i∈N 1ℓ(ω)∈si(πi(ω)).
A player’s payoff, conditional on the state being ω, is then redefined by
ui (s|ω) =


vi (ω) ℓ(ω) ∈ si (πi (ω)) andms (ω) = 1
ρ · vi(ω)
ms(ω)
ℓ(ω) ∈ si (πi (ω)) andms (ω)> 1
0 ℓ(ω) 6∈ si (πi (ω)) .
Consistency is redefined as follows. A search game has consistent payoffs if for any two
locations ℓ and ℓ′, if the prize’s interim expected private value for player i (when she is the
sole finder) is strictly lower in ℓ than in ℓ′, then the expected social value of the prize is
weakly lower in ℓ.
Definition 7. Generalized Search game G˜ has consistent payoffs if for any player i, any cell
πi ∈ Πi, and any two locations ℓ,ℓ
′ ∈ L, the following implication holds:
∑
ω∈ℓ∩πi
µi (ω) ·vi (ω)<
∑
ω∈ℓ′∩πi
µi (ω) ·vi (ω) ⇒
∑
ω∈ℓ∩πi
µs (ω) ·vs (ω)≤
∑
ω∈ℓ′∩πi
µs
(
ω′
)
·vs
(
ω′
)
.
24
Balancedness is redefined as follows. We say that a search game is r-balanced if the
prize’s interim expected private value for player i (when she is the sole finder), in any two
locations which are possible given her posterior information, differs by a factor of at most r.
Formally:
Definition 8. Let r≥ 1. Generalized search game G˜ has r-balanced payoffs if for any player
i, cell πi ∈ Πi, and pair of locations ℓ,ℓ
′ ∈ L such that ℓ′ ∩πi 6= ∅, the following inequality
holds: ∑
ω∈ℓ∩πi
vi (ω) ·µi (ω)≤ r ·
∑
ω∈ℓ′∩πi
vi (ω) ·µi (ω) .
All other parts of the baseline model remain the same.
5.2 Equivalence Result with Weakly Deterministic Signals
Our results about simple search games hold in the current setup if we assume that the signal
of any player is determined by the prize’s location and the signal of another player. Formally:
Definition 9. Generalized search game G˜ has weakly deterministic signals if ℓ(ω) = ℓ(ω′)
and πi (ω) = πi (ω
′)⇒ πj (ω) = πj (ω), for any two states ω,ω
′ ∈ Ω and any two players i, j.
In words, if two states ω,ω′ share the same location and are indistinguishable to one of
the players, then these states must be indistinguishable to all players. This implies that the
prize’s location and the signal of one of the players jointly determine the signal of all players.
A generalized search game is equivalent to a simple search game if there exists a bijection
between the sets of strategies of each game that keeps the payoff of all players the same.
Definition 10. Simple search game G and generalized search game G˜ with the same set of
players, the same capacities, and the same duplication factor are equivalent if there exists
a bijection f : S
(
G˜
)
→ S (G), such that u˜i (s˜) = ui (f (s˜)) and U˜ (s˜) = U (f (s˜)) for every
strategy profile s˜ ∈ S
(
G˜
)
and every player i.
It is immediate that equivalent games have equivalent sets of Nash equilibria; i.e., s˜ is a
Nash equilibrium of G˜ iff f (s˜) is a Nash equilibrium of G, and both equilibria yield the same
payoffs to all players and to society. Next we show that any generalized search game with
weakly deterministic signals is equivalent to a simple game, which implies that all our results
can be extended to generalized search games with weakly deterministic signals. Formally:
Claim 2. Let G˜ be a generalized search game with weakly deterministic signals. Then there
exists an equivalent simple search game G= (N,Ω,v,µ,Π, c,ρ). Moreover, if G˜ is consistent
or balanced, then so is G.
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Sketch of proof; the straightforward long proof is omitted for brevity. We say that two states
in G˜ are equivalent if they have the same location and no player can distinguish between the
two states (i.e., the states are elements of the same cell, for any player). We construct the
equivalent simple game G by the following two steps: (1) merge equivalent states into a single
state, and (2) extend the set of locations, such that each location corresponds to a single
(possibly merged) state. The value of each merged state is defined as the weighted average of
the values of the corresponding equivalent states. The prior of each merged state is defined
as the sum of the priors of the corresponding states. The equivalence of the two games, and
the invariance of the consistency and balancedness of the payoffs, are straightforward. The
simple process of constructing the equivalent simple game is demonstrated in Figure 7.
Figure 7: Illustration of Claim 2. The upper panel presents a generalized two-player
search game G˜ with weakly deterministic signals. The lower panel describes the equivalent
simple game G in which (1) states ω2b and ω2c are merged to ω2bc, and (2) each location has
been divided into singletons.
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5.3 Counterexamples without Weakly Deterministic Signals
Figure 8 demonstrates a failure of each of our main results without the assumption of weakly
deterministic signals: the left panel demonstrates the failure of Theorem 1, and the right
panel demonstrates the failure of Proposition 4 (which implies a failure of Theorem 2).
Figure 8: The left panel presents a counterexample to Theorem 1 (without weakly
deterministic signals). It shows the essentially unique suboptimal equilibrium and the non-
Nash socially optimal profile in a generalized two-player search game with 1.1-consistent and
balanced payoffs and c ≡ 1. The right panel presents a counterexample to Propo-
sition 4. It shows a three-player generalized search game with c ≡ 1 in which coordinated
search allows the players to always find the prize, whereas this is not possible without co-
ordination. Each player’s partition has two cells: one with 4 states (which is drawn in the
figure), and another with the remaining 5 states (which is not drawn, to make the figure less
crowded). The figure shows a coordinated-search profile that always finds the prize: each
player i divides her search effort equally between locations ℓ123 and ℓ456 in her four-state
cell, and exerts all of her effort to location ℓi+6 in the other cell. By contrast, in any pure
strategy profile in which ω7, ω8, and ω9 are all searched by some player, either ℓ123 or ℓ456
is not searched by any player in at least one state of the world.
5.4 Non-monotone Value of Information
Our final example (illustrated in Figure 9) demonstrates that in generalized search games the
maximal equilibrium social payoff might be non-monotone with respect to refinement of the
information of the players. Specifically, it presents a search game in which there is an exhaus-
tive equilibrium if the players’ private signal is either non-informative or fully-informative,
while the equilibrium payoff is strictly smaller with intermediate informativeness.
Example 8. Let (N = {1,2} ,Ω= {ω1,ω2,ω3,ω4} ,v≡ 1,µ,Π,L= {{ω1,ω2} ,{ω3,ω4}} , c≡ 1,
ρ = 1) be a generalized search game, where states ℓ12 ≡ {ω1,ω2} correspond to one prize’s
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location, and states ℓ34 = {ω3,ω4} correspond to another prize’s location. The common
prior distribution µ is: µ(ω1) = µ(ω3) = 0.5− ǫ and µ(ω2) = µ(ω4) = ǫ, and assume that ǫ
is small, say ǫ = 10%. With the trivial partitions (Π ≡ Ω), all (pure) Nash equilibria are
exhaustive (the prize is always found), and are characterized by one player searching in lo-
cation ℓ12 and the other player searching in location ℓ34. Similarly, with the full-information
partitions (Π ≡ {{ω1} ,{ω2} ,{ω3} ,{ω4}}), each player knows the prize’s location, and the
unique equilibrium is exhaustive (each player searches the true prize’s location). Finally,
consider the case of symmetric partially-informative signals that induce the symmetric par-
titions Π≡{{ω1,ω4} ,{ω2,ω3}} . Observe that in this case (in which balancedness is violated)
the unique equilibrium is both players searching in ω3 (resp., ω1) after observing the signal
{ω2,ω3} (resp., {ω1,ω4}), which implies that the prize is not found when the state of the
world is either ω1 or ω3.
Figure 9: Illustration of Example 8. Non-monotone value of information in a symmetric
two-player generalized search game.
A Application: Games with Intersecting Signals
We say that a search game has k-intersecting signals if the intersection of any profile of cells
(one for each player) includes at least k elements. Formally:
Definition 11. Search gameG has k-intersecting signals if for each profile of cells (π1, ..,πn)∈
Π1× ...×Πn there are at least k different states in π1∩ ...∩πn.
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Therefore, k-intersecting signals have the property that each signal of player i has a pos-
itive probability conditional on any profile of signals observed by the other players. Observe
that having 1-intersecting signals is substantially weaker than having independent signals
(i.e., than requiring that the probability that player i observes a signal is independent of
the signals observed by others). The assumption of k-intersecting signals seems plausible
(especially for k= 1) in situations like Example 1, if each research lab has a unique expertise,
that is, in some sense, separate from all the information that can be obtained by the other
labs.
Our final result states that search games with k-intersecting signals and capacities of
at most k have appealing efficiency properties. Namely, such games admit a redundancy-
free strategy profile iff
∑
i∈N ci · |Πi| ≤ |Ω|, and they admit an exhaustive strategy profile
iff
∑
i∈N ci · |Πi| ≥ |Ω|. Moreover, this strategy profile is an equilibrium if the payoffs are
balanced. Formally:
Proposition 5. Let G be a search game with capacity ci ≤ k for every player i∈N and with
k-intersecting signals (resp., and with balanced payoffs). Then the game G admits
1. a redundancy-free strategy profile (resp., equilibrium) iff
∑
i∈N ci · |Πi| ≤ |Ω|;
2. an exhaustive strategy profile (resp., equilibrium) iff
∑
i∈N ci · |Πi| ≥ |Ω|.
Sketch of proof; see Appendix B.4 for the formal proof. Let M be the set of players whose
partitions are not trivial. Consider a smaller auxiliary search game created by omitting all
players in N \M . Since the signals are k-intersecting, each cell of each player must contain
at least k · 2|M |−1 elements. Since this number is at least k · |M |, Corollary 4 implies that
the smaller game admits a redundancy-free strategy profile. If
∑
i∈N ci · |Πi| ≤ |Ω|, then we
can let the remaining players (with trivial partitions) choose one by one a location that has
not been chosen by other players yet. The resulting strategy profile is redundancy-free in
G. If
∑
i∈N ci · |Πi| ≥ |Ω|, then there are sufficiently many remaining players (with trivial
partitions) to cover all locations, and hence the resulting strategy profile is exhaustive.
B Formal Proofs
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1 (Search Games are Weakly Acyclic)
Player i has ci units of capacity, which we index by numbers between 1 and ci. A cell-unit
of player i is a pair (π,j) where π ∈ Πi is a cell of player i, and 1 ≤ j ≤ ci is a unit index.
A strategy of i chooses a location for every cell-unit of i. Let us think of player i as being
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composed of many “smaller” decision makers, one decision maker for every cell-unit of hers.
The payoff gα of cell-unit α of player i is the (ex-ante) expected payoff that α contributes to
the overall expected payoff of player i; i.e., if α chooses location ω and overall there are m
cell-units choosing ω, then gα(ω|m) equals µi(ω) · vi(ω) if m = 1 and equals ρ·µi(ω)·vi(ω)/m if
m> 1.
Given a strategy profile s, suppose that a single cell-unit α of player i changes its choice
from ω to ω′. If such a change improves the payoff of α then this is of course also an
improvement for player i. Conversely, suppose that some change of strategy for player i is
an improvement for her. Since her expected payoff is the sum of the expected payoffs within
each cell, there must be at least one cell π ∈ Πi such that the expected payoff within π has
improved by this change. The improvement within π consists of switching from choosing
one subset of π (of size at most ci) to choosing another subset, and there must be at least
one unit index j such that the payoff of the cell-unit (π,j) has improved by switching from
some ω to another ω′ that was not chosen by player i under s. Hence, the cell-unit (π,j)
can improve its payoff by itself in the profile s.
Lemma 1. Suppose that B is a set of cell-units (of various players), α /∈B is another cell-
unit, and s is a strategy profile under which every member of B is best-responding. Then
there exists a finite sequence of cell-unit improvements s= s1, . . . , sK such that every member
of B∪{α} is best-responding under sK .
Proof. Suppose that α is not best-responding in s; otherwise we are done. Let α move from
its current choice ω0 to another location that is a best-response for α. The new strategy
profile is s2. Now we add a dummy player at ω0, and Phase I begins: at every stage of Phase
I, one member of B ∪{α} who is currently not best-responding moves to a best-response
location. This continues as long as there are such non-best-responding members, unless
someone moves into ω0, in which case Phase I immediately terminates.
We claim that under any strategy profile t encountered during Phase I, it is the case that:
(a) there exists exactly one location ω that is chosen by one more cell-unit than under s,
i.e., mt(ω) =ms(ω)+1, while for every other location ω
′, mt(ω
′) =ms(ω
′) (we call ω “the
plus location”); and
(b) for any member of B ∪{α} whose current location is some ω and who can also choose
another location ω′, if there werems(ω) cell-units at ω (including itself) andms(ω
′) cell-units
at ω′, then this member would have no incentive to move from ω to ω′.
When Phase I starts, in s2, (a) holds and α has just moved to the plus location. (b)
also holds because members of B were best-responding under s, and α is currently best-
responding when α’s current location is the plus location, let alone when it is not the plus
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location. The claim is proved by induction from one stage to the next: suppose that cell-unit
β improves on stage τ by moving from ω to ω′. Since β could improve on stage τ , (b) implies
that ω must have been the plus location in that stage. Therefore, the plus will move with β
from ω to ω′, and hence (a) will still hold in stage τ +1. Property (b) will still hold in stage
τ +1, since β will be best-responding at ω′ although ω′ will be the plus location by then,
and the situation will not change for the other cell-units, as they did not move.
By our definition of strategies, a cell-unit cannot move to a location occupied by another
cell-unit of the same player. Thus, we should note that since β moves from ω to ω′, there
may be another cell-unit γ of the same player that will be able to move to ω in stage τ +1.
Nevertheless, by (b) we know that γ has no incentive to move to ω′ in stage τ , which would
yield γ the same payoff gβ(ω
′|mt(ω
′)+1) that β will receive in stage τ +1, which is more
(since the move is an improvement) than the payoff of β in stage τ , gβ(ω|mt(ω)), which is
what γ would receive by moving to ω on stage τ+1. Hence, γ will have no incentive to move
to ω in stage τ +1, and (b) will not be violated, and the claim is proven.
Suppose cell-unit β moves to some ω and thus improves its payoff. Then ω becomes the
plus location, and afterwards the payoff of β at ω can never be worse than it is now, while it
can be better if the plus is somewhere else. Thus, the payoff of β will never go down to the
level before the movement. Hence, Phase I cannot turn into a cycle, and since there are only
finitely many strategy profiles, Phase I must eventually end. Also note that ω0 is never the
plus location during Phase I (since Phase I terminates once someone moves to ω0), and hence
nobody moves from ω0 to another location. Therefore, all the movements are improvements
not only in the game with the dummy added at ω0, but also in the original game.
Denote the strategy profile at the end of Phase I by s∗. Now we remove the dummy from
ω0. Suppose first that Phase I ended because somebody moved into ω0. Since the dummy
has been removed, there is no plus location at all, and (b) implies that every member of
B∪{α} is best-responding under s∗, and we are done.
Otherwise, Phase I ended at s∗ because nobody had an incentive to move when the
dummy was still at ω0. Starting from s
∗, we define Phase II analogously to Phase I (while
Phase I more or less described a process of restabilizing the system after one cell-unit is
added, Phase II describes restabilizing it after one cell-unit is removed), as follows. At every
stage, out of the members of B ∪{α} who are currently not best-responding, choose one
whose current payoff is minimal, and let it move to a better location. This continues as long
as there are non-best-responding members.
Let mˆs∗(ω) denote the number of cell-units including the dummy who chose ω at s
∗. We
claim that under any strategy profile t encountered during Phase II, it is the case that:
(a’) there exists exactly one location ω for which mt(ω) = mˆs∗(ω)−1, while for every other
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location ω′, mt(ω
′) = mˆs∗(ω) (we call ω “the minus location”); and
(b’) for any member of B∪{α} whose current location is ω and who can also choose another
location ω′, if there were mˆs∗(ω) cell-units at ω (including itself) and mˆs∗(ω
′) cell-units at
ω′, then this member would have no incentive to move from ω to ω′.
The analysis is almost analogous to that of Phase I. When Phase II starts, in the profile
s∗, (a’) holds and ω0 is the minus location. (b’) also holds because everyone was best-
responding under s∗ when the dummy was in place. The claim is proved by induction from
one stage to the next: suppose that cell-unit β improves on stage τ by moving from ω to
ω′. Improvement implies, by (b’), that ω′ must have been the minus location in that stage.
Therefore, the minus will move from ω′ to ω, and hence (a’) will still hold in stage τ +1.
Property (b’) will also still hold in stage τ+1, since β will be best-responding at ω′ when the
minus will be somewhere else, let alone when there is no minus anywhere, and the situation
does not change for the other cell-units, as they did not move.
Since β moves from ω to ω′, there may be another cell-unit γ of the same player that will
be able to move to ω in stage τ+1. Nevertheless, the payoff of β at ω in stage τ , gβ (ω|mt (ω)),
does not exceed the payoff of γ in that stage (because a cell-unit that is chosen to move has
a minimal payoff), and exactly equals what γ will receive by moving to ω in stage τ +1.
Hence, γ will have no incentive to move to ω, (b’) will not be violated, and the claim is
proven.
Suppose that cell-unit β moves to some ω and thus improves its payoff. Then ω ceases
to be the minus location, and afterwards the payoff of β at ω can never be worse than it
is now, while it can be better if the minus is at ω. Therefore, the payoff of β will never go
down to the level it was at before the movement, and will of course improve when β moves
again. Hence, Phase II cannot turn into a cycle, and therefore it must eventually end. When
it ends, every member of B∪{α} will be best-responding.
To prove weak acyclicity, start from any strategy profile s1. By applying Lemma 1
inductively we obtain a sequence of cell-unit improvements that lead to a profile under
which one cell-unit is best-responding, then two, and so on. Eventually we get a profile
sK under which every cell-unit is best-responding. These cell-unit improvements are also
improvements in the original sense, and sK is an equilibrium.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 3 (Any f ∈ FC Can Be Induced by τ ∈ T )
Denote Πˆ = {(i;πi) : i ∈N,πi ∈ Πi}. We construct a flow network, namely, a directed graph
D = (V,E) with vertices V and edges E ⊂ V ×V , and a flow capacity κ(v
1
,v
2
)≥ 0 for every
edge (v
1
,v
2
) (illustrated beside the sketch of this proof, in Figure 5). There are two special
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vertices, a source s and a sink t. The other vertices in our network are the states Ω and the
cells Πˆ of the game. There is an edge from s to every (i;πi) ∈ Πˆ, where κ(s,(i;πi)) = ci, and
an edge from every state ω ∈ Ω to t, where κ(ω,t) = f(ω). Also, there is an edge from a cell
(i;πi) ∈ Πˆ to a state ω iff πi contains ω, and the flow capacity κ of such edges is infinite (for
a textbook presentation of flow networks; see, e.g., Cormen et al., 2009, Ch. 26).
A cut of D is a subset of edges C ⊂ E, such that if all the edges of C are removed then
there exists no path between s and t. Suppose that C is a minimal cut, i.e., a cut whose sum
of capacities is minimal. Then C certainly does not include any edge between a cell and a
state, as those edges have an infinite flow capacity. Suppose that C includes, out of the edges
from states to t, exactly the edges {(ω,t) : ω ∈Q} for some subset of states Q⊂ Ω. Denote
W = Ω \Q. Then C must include all the edges {(s,(i;πi)) : i ∈ N,πi ∩W 6= ∅}; otherwise
there would exist a path from s to t. Hence, the total capacity of C equals
∑
ω∈Q
κ(ω,t)+
∑
i∈N
∑
πi∩W 6=∅
κ(s,(i;πi)) =
∑
ω∈Q
f(ω)+
∑
i∈N
∑
πi∩W 6=∅
ci =
∑
ω∈Q
f(ω)+
∑
i∈N
ci · |{πi ∈ Πi : πi∩W 6= ∅}| ≥
∑
ω∈Q
f(ω)+
∑
ω∈W
f(ω) =
∑
ω∈Ω
f(ω).
Therefore, the cut that consists of the all edges of type (ω,t), whose total capacity equals
∑
ω∈Ω f(ω), is minimal.
A flow in D is a function ϕ : E→ R+ such that: (i) the flow never exceeds the capacity,
i.e., ϕ(e)≤ κ(e), and (ii) the overall flow outgoing from s, namely, the sum of flows on edges
outgoing from s, equals the overall flow incoming to t, namely, the sum of flows on edges
incoming to t (call this quantity the value of the flow), and for any other vertex the incoming
flow equals the outgoing flow. The max-flow min-cut theorem (Cormen et al., 2009, p. 723,
Theorem 26.6) states that the value of the maximal flow equals the total capacity of the
minimal cut; therefore, D admits a flow ϕ of value
∑
ω∈Ω f(ω), and so it must be the case
that ϕ(ω,t) = f(ω) for every ω ∈ Ω.
Now define a coordinated-search profile τ by letting τi(πi,ω) = ϕ((i;πi),ω) for every
i ∈N ,πi ∈ Πi, and ω ∈ πi. To see that this is a coordinated-search profile we verify that for
any πi,
∑
ω∈πi τi (πi,ω) =
∑
ω∈πi ϕ((i;πi),ω) =ϕ(s,(i;πi))≤ κ(s,(i;πi)) = ci (where the second
equality is due to the equality of the outgoing and the incoming flow). To see that τ induces f ,
we verify that for any ω, it must be the case that
∑
i∈N τi (πi(ω),ω) =
∑
i∈N ϕ((i;πi(ω)),ω) =
ϕ(ω,t) = f(ω).
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B.3 Proof of Proposition 4 (Any fτ is Feasible)
A nonnegative matrix A is doubly stochastic (resp., doubly substochastic) if the sum of the
elements in each row and in each column is equal to (resp., at most) one, i.e., if
∑
jAij = 1
(resp.,
∑
jAij ≤ 1) for each row i and
∑
iAij = 1 (resp.,
∑
iAij ≤ 1) for each column j. Note
that any doubly stochastic matrix must be a square matrix (but this is not the case for
a doubly substochastic matrix). A doubly stochastic (resp., doubly substochastic) matrix
is a permutation (resp., subpermutation) matrix if it includes only zeros and ones, i.e., if
Aij ∈ {0,1} for any i, j. Note that a permutation (resp., subpermutation) matrix includes
exactly (resp., at most) one non-zero value in each row and in each column, and this value is
equal to one. The Birkhoff–von Neumann theorem states that any doubly stochastic matrix
can be written as a convex combination of permutation matrices. Formally:
Theorem 3 (Birkhoff–von Neumann Theorem). Let A be a doubly stochastic matrix. Then
there exists a finite set of permutation matrices P 1, ...,PK such that A=
∑
kwk ·P
k, where
wk ≥ 0 for each k and
∑
kwk = 1.
We present a simple extension of Theorem 3 that states that any doubly substochastic
matrix can be written as a convex combination of subpermutation matrices.9
Lemma 2. Let A be a doubly substochastic matrix. Then there exists a finite set of subper-
mutation matrices Q1, ...,QK s.t. A =
∑
kwk ·Q
k, where wk ≥ 0 for each k and
∑
kwk = 1.
Proof. Let I (resp., J) be the number of rows (resp., columns) in the matrix A. We construct
a square doubly stochastic matrix B with I+J rows and columns by merging 4 submatrices:
(1) the matrix A (with I rows and J columns) in the top-left part of B, (2) a J×J diagonal
matrix in the bottom-left part of B, where each diagonal cell completes the values in each
column of A to one, (3) an I × I diagonal matrix in the top-right part of B, where each
diagonal cell completes the values in each row of A to one, and (4) the J×I matrix AT (the
transpose of A) in the bottom-right part of B. This is illustrated in Figure 10 below. It is
immediate that B is a doubly stochastic matrix. By Theorem 3 there exists a finite set of
permutation matrices P 1, ...,PK (with I+J rows and columns) such that B =
∑
kwk ·P
k,
where wk ≥ 0 for each k and
∑
kwk = 1. Let Q
k be a submatrix of P k with the first I rows
and J columns. Then it is immediate that each Qk is a subpermutation matrix and that
A =
∑
kwk ·Q
k.
Next we rely on Lemma 2 to prove Proposition 4. Let τ be a coordinated-search profile.
Similarly to the proof of Proposition 1, we define a cell-unit as a tuple (i, j,πi), where i ∈N
9One can show that Lemma 2 is implied by the extension of the Birkhoff–von Neumann Theorem presented
in Budish et al. (2013). For completeness, we provide a self-contained proof of the lemma.
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Figure 10: Illustration of How to Construct the Square Matrix B
is a player, j ∈ {1, ..., ci} is an index corresponding to one unit of capacity of player i, and
πi ∈ Πi is a cell of player i. Let Πˆ denote the set of all cell-units with a typical element
πˆ, let Πˆi denote the subset of cell-units that correspond to player i, and let Πˆi,j denote
the subset of cell-units that correspond to capacity unit j ∈ {1, ..., ci} of player i. We write
ω ∈ πˆ = (i, j,π) if ω ∈ π.
A coordinated-search action profile (of the cell-units) is a function τ ′ that assigns to
each cell-unit (i, j,π) an element of D (π,1) (recall that an element of D (π,1) is a function
η : π → [0,1] such that
∑
ω∈π η (ω) ≤ 1). The coordinated-search profile τ can be repre-
sented as an equivalent coordinated-search action profile (of the cell-units) τ ′ that satisfies
∑ci
j=1 τ
′ ((i, j,πi) ,ω) = τi (πi,ω) for each πi ∈Πi and ω ∈Ω. The equivalent coordinated-search
action profile τ ′ can be represented as a
∣∣∣Πˆ
∣∣∣×|Ω| nonnegative matrix C as follows:
C(i,j,πi),ω =


τ ′ ((i, j,πi) ,ω) ω ∈ πi ∈ Πi
0 otherwise.
Observe that the sum of each row in C is at most one, i.e.,
∑
ω∈ΩCπˆ,ω ≤ 1, but the sum of a
column might be greater than one. Let A be the matrix derived from C by decreasing the
values of the lower cells within columns whose sum is greater than one, such that the sum
of each column is at most one. Formally (where we write πˆ′ < πˆ if the row of πˆ′ is higher
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than the row of πˆ in the matrix C):
Aπˆ,ω =


Cπˆ,ω
∑
πˆ′≤πˆCπˆ′,ω ≤ 1
1−
∑
πˆ′<πˆCπˆ′,ω
∑
πˆ′<πˆCπˆ′,ω ≤ 1<
∑
πˆ′≤πˆCπˆ′,ω
0
∑
πˆ′<πˆCπˆ′,ω > 1.
Observe that A is a doubly substochastic matrix (i.e., the sum of each row and of each column
is at most one), and that the coordinated-search action profile corresponding to A induces
the same mixed outcome as τ . By Lemma 2, there exists a finite set of subpermutation
matrices Q1, . . . ,QK such that A =
∑
kwk ·Q
k, where wk ≥ 0 for each k and
∑
kwk = 1.
Further observe that each subpermutation matrix Qk corresponds to cell-unit representation
of a pure strategy profile sk, which implies that τ induces the same mixed outcome as the
correlated strategy profile σ =
∑
kwk · s
k.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 5 (Intersecting Signals)
Let M = {i ∈N : |Πi| ≥ 2} be the set of players whose partitions are not trivial (i.e., having
at least two cells in their partition), and denote m= |M |. For any player i ∈N , state ω ∈Ω,
and any tuple of cells (πj)j 6=i, the profile of n cells (πi (ω) ,(πj)j 6=i) has at least k locations
in its intersection. Thus, πi (ω) contains at least k ·
∏
j∈N\i |Πj | such intersection points, and
k ·
∏
j∈N\i
|Πj |= k ·
∏
j∈M\i
|Πj | ≥ k ·2
m−1.
Hence, |πi (ω)| ≥ k ·2
m−1. Suppose first thatM 6= ∅. Now consider a smaller, auxiliary search
game created by omitting all players in N \M , leaving only members of M to play. Since
k ·2m−1 ≥ k ·m and ci ≤ k, Corollary 4 implies that the smaller game admits a redundancy-
free strategy s
M
. If M = ∅ then s
M
is empty and the proof proceeds the same.
Under s
M
,
∑
i∈M ci · |Πi| distinct locations are searched. Going back to the original game,
we define a strategy profile s by complementing s
M
with strategies of the members of N \M
as follows. We let them choose, one by one (within their single cell, namely, the whole Ω),
any ci locations that have not been chosen by other players yet, as long as there are such.
Case 1: Assume that
∑
i∈N ci · |Πi| ≤ |Ω|. This implies that this procedure continues until
all members of N \M have chosen. We end up with a strategy profile s that is redundancy-
free. Observe that s is also exhaustive iff
∑
i∈N ci · |Πi|= |Ω|, and that if
∑
i∈N ci · |Πi|< |Ω|
then the game does not admit an exhaustive strategy profile (as the players can search in at
most
∑
i∈N ci · |Πi| locations).
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Case 2: We are left with the case of
∑
i∈N ci · |Πi| > |Ω| in which the procedure cannot
be completed, as at some stage all the locations will already have been chosen before all the
players have been able to choose. Let the remaining players choose arbitrarily. We end up
with an exhaustive strategy profile s.
If the payoffs are balanced then, either when s is redundancy-free or when s is exhaustive,
Corollary 2 implies that G also admits such an equilibrium.
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